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— ABSTRACT —
Artykuł jest poświęcony miejscu obszaru pora-
dzieckiego w  rosyjskiej polityce zagranicznej 
od rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego w 1991 do 
2021 roku� Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie 
znaczenia obszaru poradzieckiego w rosyjskiej 
polityce zagranicznej oraz celów i instrumentów 
tej polityki wobec obszaru poradzieckiego po 
rozpadzie ZSRR� W ciągu 30 lat po rozpadzie 
Związku Radzieckiego na obszarze poradzieckim 
miały miejsce procesy reintegracji i dezintegracji� 
Dochodziło do wielu konfliktów zbrojnych, stał 
się on także polem rywalizacji w  stosunkach 
międzynarodowych� Federacja Rosyjska wyko-
rzystuje wszelkie możliwe instrumenty oddzia-
ływania, aby utrzymać kontrolę nad obszarem 
poradzieckim i nadal traktuje go jako wyłączną 
strefę wpływów Rosji i priorytetowy kierunek 
rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej�
Słowa kluczowe: obszar poradziecki; Federacja 
Rosyjska; polityka zagraniczna; reintegracja; 
Władimir Putin
— ABSTRAKT —
The article is devoted to the post-Soviet area’s 
place in Russian foreign policy from the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 to 2021� The aim of 
this article is to present the importance of the 
post-Soviet area in Russian foreign policy and the 
goals and instruments of this policy towards the 
post-Soviet area after the collapse of the USSR� 
In the 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, reintegration and disintegration processes 
took place in the post-Soviet area� There were 
numerous armed conflicts, and it also became 
a field of competition in international relations� 
The Russian Federation uses all possible influ-
ence instruments to maintain control over the 
post-Soviet area and still treats it as the exclusive 
sphere of Russian influence and Russian foreign 
policy’s priority direction�
Keywords: post-Soviet area; the Russian Federa-
tion; foreign policy; reintegration; Vladimir Putin
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INTRODUCTION
The term ‘post-Soviet area’ refers to the countries located to the south and west 
of the Russian Federation� They were created after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the region of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), the South 
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)� The exception is made for the 
Baltic republics because they chose to join the EU and NATO in 2004� Until 
2009, the post-Soviet area’s equivalent was the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)� Still, when Georgia left the CIS, it left the region somewhat ‘without 
a name’� The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 meant the need to 
redefine international relations in the Eurasian region� As the main political and 
legal successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation faces the formula-
tion of its foreign policy towards the post-Soviet area� The importance of the 
post-Soviet area in Russia’s policy is determined by several factors: territorial 
proximity, challenges, and threats coming from there (Islamic fundamentalism, 
terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration), strategic location 
(communication and trade routes, e�g�, the Silk Road), economic ties, centuries-
old historical, cultural and religious ties, a significant number of Russian and 
Russian-speaking people living in post-Soviet republics�
Thirty years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union� At that time, 
many studies covered many aspects of the post-Soviet area’s functioning, and 
the Russian Federation’s policy towards the so-called ‘near abroad’ appeared� 
Among Polish authors dealing with the discussed topic, there are works by: A� 
Włodkowska-Bagan, T� Stępniewski, M� Raś� Foreign authors dealing with the 
issues related to the post-Soviet area include, among others, G� Toal, A� Skriba, 
A�A� Kazantsev� The article is based on an analysis of Polish and English literature 
on the subject mentioned above� The research method used in this work is the 
method of analyzing the sources in the form of the concepts of the foreign 
policy of the Russian Federation adopted during the presidency of subsequent 
presidents� The article uses a systemic method treating the post-Soviet area as 
a system influenced by the policy of the Russian Federation and a decision-
making method to determine specific instruments of influence of the Russian 
Federation concerning the post-Soviet area� The article is based on a subject, 
problematic approach, as it refers to several challenging issues that seem to be of 
crucial importance regarding the significance of the post-Soviet area in Russian 
foreign policy�
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The main research question is: What are the post-Soviet area’s position and 
place in Russian foreign policy after the USSR collapsed in 1991? Detailed 
research questions refer to the most critical problems in the post-Soviet area’s 
functioning� They are as follows: What were and are the Russian foreign policy’s 
objectives and instruments concerning the post-Soviet area? What processes are 
taking place in the post-Soviet area? What conflicts took place in the post-Soviet 
area, and how did they affect the post-Soviet countries’ security? What interests 
do other entities of international relations have in the post-Soviet area?
The article’s central thesis is: the Russian Federation uses all possible influence 
instruments to maintain control over the post-Soviet area, treated as the exclusive 
sphere of Russian influence and the priority direction of Russian foreign policy�
Detailed theses refer to the research questions posed:
– the main goals of Russian foreign policy towards the post-Soviet area 
include the political, economic, and military integration of this area under 
the leadership of Russia,
– the essential instruments of Russian influence in the post-Soviet area 
include political, military, economic, and the so-called soft power – Russia 
has a ‘comprehensive’ impact on the countries of the post-Soviet region,
– in the post-Soviet area, there are mainly reintegration processes inspired 
by Russia, but also disintegration processes take place through the creation 
of alternative cooperation structures, bypassing Russia,
– the post-Soviet area is an arena of several unresolved conflicts (the so-
called ‘frozen conflicts’), which Russia uses as instruments of pressure on 
rebellious countries that choose the pro-Western option in their foreign 
policy,
– the post-Soviet area is a field of rivalry between Russia, China, and the 
West since each of these actors has their interests in this area; Russia is 
committed to eliminating the influence of third countries in the post-
Soviet area�
OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TOWARDS THE POST-SOVIET AREA
For 30 years, the post-Soviet area has been a priority direction in the Russian 
Federation’s foreign policy (Nikitin, 2008, p� 7)� Its priority importance for Russia 
has been emphasized in all foreign policy programming documents, starting 
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from 1993, when The Russian Federation’s Concept of the Foreign Policy was 
published (April 23, 1993)� This document should be considered the first to 
define Russia’s priorities for international activity� The following four concepts 
of the Russian foreign policy (of June 28, 2000, July 12, 2008, February 18, 2013, 
and November 30, 2016) differ in assessing challenges, threats, goals, means, and 
methods� It is understandable because of the evolution of international relations 
and Russia’s global environment, but the ‘near abroad’ takes a key place in them� 
Since the Russian Federation’s establishment, the Russian decision-makers ini-
tially used the term ‘near abroad’ to describe the fourteen former Soviet republics� 
As a result of opposition from the three Baltic republics, which explicitly opted 
for a pro-Western direction in foreign policy, the term ‘near abroad’ is currently 
used in official state documents for only eleven former Soviet republics� The term 
‘near abroad’ means that Russia perceives the ‘near abroad’ countries through the 
prism of specific historical, political, and economic ties, strategic importance, 
character, and uniqueness, in which vital Russian interests focus�
One of the fundamental and unchanging Russian foreign policy goals has 
become strategic control over the post-Soviet area� It has been recognized as 
‘Russia’s sphere of interests’ because, for Russia, one of the main conditions 
for maintaining superpower status is its domination in the post-Soviet area 
(Mankoff, 2011, p� 345)� Russia’s strategic goal is to create a regional order in the 
post-Soviet area dominated by Russia, including building integration structures 
subordinate to Moscow� The primary and most crucial goal of Russia concerning 
the post-Soviet area is to keep it within the sphere of Russian influence, i�e�, to 
limit the impact of other actors potentially having a strong voice in essential 
matters for the region and to take care that any of the geopolitical players does 
not contest this prerogative (Zhiltsov, 2018, p� 10)�
Russia’s goals concerning the post-Soviet area focus on four main areas: 
politics, security, economy, and the so-called soft power (Ebzeeva, 2017, p� 20)� 
In Russia’s political sphere, the post-Soviet area countries must not form alliances 
with other external actors but remain in the structures of cooperation controlled 
by Russia� In the sphere of  security, Russia’s primary goal is to cover the entire 
post-Soviet area with the collective security system guaranteed by Russia� In 
the sphere of economy, Russia aims to maintain the countries’ dependence on 
trade with each other in selected sectors and supporting the transit monopoly 
position of energy resources (Skriba, 2016, p� 610)� In  soft power, Russia depends 
on retaining the Russian language and Russian media position in the region� The 
tool used in this sphere of Russian influence has been the concept of the ‘Russian 
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world’, which is a form of promoting the idea of  Russia as a civilization center 
separate from Asian civilizations and opposed in many ways to Western culture 
(Freire, 2019, p� 800)�
Russia has a wide range of instruments to influence the countries of the 
post-Soviet area� They can be grouped into four main overlapping categories: 
1) political, 2) military, 3) economic, 4) soft power (Rutland & Kazantsev, 2016, 
p� 396)� One of the political instruments is domination in regional cooperation 
structures established at Russia’s initiative in the post-Soviet area� Reintegration 
is one way of maintaining and strengthening Russian influence in the post-Soviet 
area and limiting third actors’ impact in the region� In the political and security 
dimension, the key organizations from Russia’s perspective are the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)� The strengthening 
of Russia’s position in the post-Soviet countries is also promoted by disseminat-
ing its political model – ‘sovereign democracy’ (Okara, 2007, p� 9) and supporting 
leaders favorable to Russia and its reintegration projects� ‘Sovereign democracy’ 
is a remedy for ‘color revolutions’ and the expansion of other actors’ influence 
in the post-Soviet area�
The most spectacular instrument is the Russian military presence in many 
former republics and Moscow’s involvement in armed conflicts in the post-Soviet 
area, which in most cases remain unresolved to this day (Strachota, 2003, p� 80)� 
Military bases are a form of guaranteeing the Russian military presence in the 
former Soviet republics� Under the agreements concluded in the 1990s, Russia 
obtained military bases in Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Ukraine (Black Sea Fleet)� Moreover, according to bilateral agreements, 
Russia had at its disposal radar stations in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, 
communication nodes, and the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan� Having 
military bases in ‘near abroad’ countries, apart from security and stabilization in 
regional conflict, is also justified by protecting the Russian and Russian-speaking 
minorities living in conflict regions� Russia was a mediator in all the conflicts that 
took place in the post-Soviet area� It was the leading creator of the agreements 
and their guarantor, and often the support for separatism and the participation 
of Russian forces on one of the sides of the conflict determined its outcome 
(Gvosdev & Marsh, 2013, p� 456)� The economic instruments include: Russian 
assets in various countries in the region, a dominant position in the transit of 
energy resources through the Russian territory to recipients in the West, Russia’s 
tariff policy on goods exported to the countries of the region, the application 
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of a policy prohibiting importing certain goods from countries defiant against 
Russia through economic embargoes� Concerning some countries (Belarus, 
Ukraine), Russia applied a preferential prices policy to supply energy resources� 
In the event of deteriorating relations, it resorted to pressure and economic 
blackmail� They led to gas crises and pursuing a policy of ‘bypassing’ the existing 
transit countries, i�e�, Belarus and Ukraine, by pushing for new infrastructure 
investments (construction of the Nord Stream I and II gas pipeline, or Turkish 
Stream)� A characteristic principle in Russia’s policy is that a state that cooperates 
or shows a willingness to cooperate is rewarded, and those that oppose Russia 
are punished� Russia uses ‘hard’ tools in its policy towards the ‘rebellious’ in such 
a situation� They are trade blockade, energy embargoes, differentiating energy 
prices depending on the level of compliance of a given state’s policy with Russian 
interests, taking over infrastructure, especially energy, supporting separatisms, 
and military action or economic blackmail�
The concept of soft power means to achieve goals and is an extension of the 
possible ways of influencing and achieving goals by actors in international rela-
tions� Therefore, it attempts to show the ‘other face of strength’, that is, opposition 
to the hard power components of power – military and economic� According 
to Joseph Nye’s definition, soft power is the state’s ability to get what it wants 
through attractiveness, not through coercion or payment (Nye, 2004, p� 191)� 
The soft power category includes cultural closeness, knowledge of the Russian 
language, interpersonal contacts, access to Russian media (television, the Inter-
net, press), contacts with the Orthodox churches, the rhetoric of brotherhood 
(the concept of the Russian world)� Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu propose 
the following catalog of ‘soft’ tools of the Russian neighborhood policy: Russian 
mass media, financing of NGOs, economic growth, visa-free movement, open 
labor market, authoritarian capitalism, supporting authoritarian regimes, export-
ing ‘sovereign democracy’, Russian citizenship and pensions, military training 
(Leonard & Popescu, 2008, p� 89)�
REINTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION PROCESSES  
IN THE POST-SOVIET AREA
From the moment the decision to break up the Soviet Union was taken, it became 
clear that Russia would try to rebuild its influence in the post-Soviet area and 
use the existing ties to continue cooperation with the new, already independ-
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ent republics� Its main task was to maintain unique relations with the former 
republics� In the first half of the 1990s, Russia attempted to recreate integration 
ties encompassing all or the vast majority of the former Soviet republics� When 
this strategy did not bring the expected results, Russia chose a so-called multi-
speed integration to deepen integration in groups of states and specific spheres 
(political, economic, security) (Krickovic, 2014, p� 519)� These tendencies then 
intensified in the 2000s, after Vladimir Putin came to power, when other Russian 
projects for deeper integration appeared (Rumer, 2019, p� 62)� It concerns the 
political, economic, and security spheres� As part of political cooperation, the 
post-Soviet area’s main structure is the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(Kembayev, 2009, p� 217)� Despite ambitious and far-reaching plans supported by 
nearly a thousand agreements, the CIS did not meet Russian expectations� The 
failure of integration within the CIS is associated with the growing involvement 
of third countries in the region and the strengthening of the western direction in 
some former Soviet republics’ politics� The most important reintegration project 
in economic cooperation is currently the Eurasian Economic Union (Papava, 
2019, p� 18)�
On the other hand, in the field of security, the former Soviet republics cooper-
ate based on the Collective Security Treaty Organization� Cooperation within 
these structures remains largely declarative and ineffective, and the primary goal 
of these organizations is to maintain Moscow’s political influence in individual 
regions� The post-Soviet institutional cooperation’s practice proves that former 
USSR republics are incapable of creating effective integration structures, both in 
the twelve formats and in a smaller group� For Moscow, integration projects are 
essential in two dimensions – economic and geopolitical� In the first dimension, 
they are to be a response primarily to China’s economic expansion� In the second 
one – to prove Russia’s superpower position and give it an asset in relations with 
other global players�
In the post-Soviet area, one can observe the reintegration processes inspired 
by Russia, on the one hand� On the other hand, there are disintegration trends 
pushed by some countries created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which 
tried to resist Russia’s domination and did not enter into joint structures of 
cooperation with it� The most advanced manifestation of disintegration in 
foreign and security policy was the example of the Baltic republics, which ruled 
out the possibility of participating in any institutionalized forms of cooperation 
proposed by Russia� The determined position of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on 
the choice of the pro-Western option and the consistent striving for membership 
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in the European Union and NATO led to the extension of these structures by 
three Baltic republics in 2004� A manifestation of a more decisive turn to the 
West by some former Soviet republics was the emergence of alternative groups 
without Russia and the ‘color revolutions’ which brought decidedly pro-Western 
politicians to power� In some of the former Soviet republics, the GUAM project 
(bringing together four countries: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) 
was founded in 1997, transformed in 2006 into a regional organization called 
GUAM – Organization for Democracy and Economic Development� Its mem-
bers declared, among other things, a continuation of activities aimed at European 
integration by strengthening ties with the European Union and NATO� There 
have been so-called ‘color revolutions’ in some countries as peaceful protests 
and social movements resulting from social and political changes� In Georgia, 
the ‘Rose Revolution’, in Ukraine the ‘Orange Revolution’, and in Kyrgyzstan, 
the ‘Tulip Revolution’ have resulted in numerous forecasts of the spread of 
democratic changes in the post-Soviet area� The events of the color revolutions 
confirmed the aspirations for pro-Western integration� They contradicted the 
policy of reintegration of the post-Soviet area pushed by Russia� Some of the 
former post-Soviet republics did not agree to Russia’s subordination system in 
the structures of cooperation, characterized by asymmetry in favor of Russia� 
For the latter group of countries ‘defiant’ towards Russia, cooperation with the 
European Union under the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern 
Partnership program was of great importance (Korosteleva, 2011a, p� 252)�
MILITARY CONFLICTS IN THE POST-SOVIET AREA
The post-Soviet area is the scene of many unresolved conflicts� Their genesis 
dates back to the times of the Soviet Union, and the direct cause of their outbreak 
in the early 1990s was the desire to take advantage of the situation when the fate 
of the USSR was at stake� Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied 
by local ethnic and ideological armed conflicts that arose from deep historical 
conditions and the USSR’s national policy and the gradual political, economic 
and social disintegration that engulfed the USSR� The most important armed 
conflicts in the post-Soviet area concern: Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), 
Transnistria (Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), and recently eastern 
Ukraine joined this group� In the literature on the subject, they are sometimes 
called ‘frozen conflicts’ (Kazantsev et al�, 2020, p� 148)� Their phenomenon is that 
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most of them did not conclude with a peace agreement� It was not possible to 
find a satisfactory solution for all interested parties� They continue to destabilize 
the situation in the post-Soviet area� Each of these conflicts has its specificity� 
Still, despite many differences (e�g�, intensity, number of victims, parties involved, 
degree of internationalization), most of them also show standard features, e�g�, 
in terms of genesis, course, and evolution, place in regional policy, geopolitical 
conditions, or short and long-term consequences for conflict-affected areas and 
their surroundings� The most important standard features include the following:
1) Most of them went through similar phases – from the so-called hot 
(military) phase, when armed struggles continued, through the nor-
malization phase aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict� In some 
cases, the ‘defrosting of the conflict’ took place when the opposing parties 
again attempted to solve the problem by armed struggle (the subject of 
Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016 and 2020 or the war in Georgia in 2008)� 
However, a permanent settlement of conflicts was not achieved either by 
force or by negotiation, often in a multilateral format, with external actors’ 
involvement (UN, CSCE/OSCE, European Union)�
2) In most conflict-affected areas, para-states (quasi-states) were established, 
which became a permanent element of the balance of power in the region, 
strengthened their independence, and got out of the appropriate control 
states� The situation of para-states means that separatist regions have 
the attributes of power but lack of international recognition� With each 
subsequent year of existence, para-states deepen the division with their 
home states on the political and economic levels and ordinary citizens’ 
practices�
3) Russian support for para-states takes the form of military aid (rearma-
ment), political support (partiality in mediation), and economic support 
(economic aid for rebellious republics)�
4) The persistence of the situation of freezing conflicts negatively affects the 
situation in the region – on the one hand, conflicts hinder the develop-
ment of the appropriate states, on the other, para-states become a base for 
terrorism, smuggling, organized crime, and other negative phenomena� 
When excluded from external forces’ control, they create conditions for 
developing illegal activities, making the sensation of the so-called ‘black 
holes’�
5) Conflicts have become a permanent element of the political game in 
international relations, becoming in the hands of Russia an essential 
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instrument of torpedoing all efforts of the mother states to integrate with 
the European Union or NATO (Malyarenko & Wolff, 2018, p� 201)� In 
most cases, these countries became the object of geopolitics, not their 
subject, and their relations with the world were in line with the general 
tendencies of relations between the more important and more decisive 
international players: Russia, the USA, Turkey, Iran, China, OSCE, EU, and 
NATO (Allison, 2017, p� 524)�
6) Russian forces have played and continue to play an essential role in devel-
oping the situation stationed in most para-states� The prolongation of the 
existing conflicts and the promotion of separatism is part of the divide 
and rule policy (Rezvani, 2020, p� 889)� Russia can keep the conflict ‘frozen’, 
which enables it to use it as an instrument of pressure or to ‘unfreeze’ it at 
any convenient time�
THE POST-SOVIET AREA AS A FIELD OF COMPETITION 
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the increasing involvement of third 
countries in the region became a severe challenge for Russia in the post-Soviet 
area� It turned out that the former Soviet republics, for various reasons, became 
an object of interest from other countries, such as the United States, European 
Union countries, China, Turkey, and Iran� Initially, these actors’ activity in the 
post-Soviet area resulted, among other things, from the desire to fill the political 
vacuum that appeared there after the collapse of the USSR and the related danger 
of destabilization of the post-Soviet area� Natural resources were also crucial for 
all the actors involved, especially oil and gas, as the post-Soviet countries (to 
a varying degree) have significant energy resources and belong to global produc-
ers and exporters of oil and gas� The region of particular interest has become the 
Caspian region, where Russia’s interests and the interests of the Caspian states 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), the US, the European Union, and 
transnational companies clash� The post-Soviet area has become a field of rivalry, 
the formation of interest zones, the intersection of communication and trade 
routes, and the transport of energy resources (Sussex, 2012, p� 216)� The reasons 
for the interest in the post-Soviet area by other entities are political, military, 
and economic�
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The growing interest and involvement of third countries in the post-Soviet 
area caused concern in Russia about the possibility of displacing it from its 
traditional sphere of influence, which would undermine its superpower status� 
Russia is the only one active in the post-Soviet area in the political, military, 
economic, social and cultural spheres� The other actors focus their policy towards 
this region on selected locations: China, primarily on the economy (energy sup-
plies), the United States on security (the Central Asia region was important dur-
ing Afghanistan’s American mission)� On the one hand, Russia’s policy towards 
the former Soviet republics is to maintain Russian influence in the spheres of 
involvement mentioned above, and on the other hand, to restrain and limit the 
impact of other players interested in this region�
The factors that influenced the United States’ increased interest in the post-
Soviet area, mainly in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, were connected 
with Afghanistan’s anti-terrorist operation� The geographical proximity of the 
Caucasian and Central Asian states to Afghanistan contributed to the interest 
and intensification of the United States’ activities in the possibility of deploying 
its military bases in this region� Based on bilateral agreements, the Americans 
opened their air bases in Kyrgyzstan (in Manas) and Uzbekistan� The European 
Union and the USA are involved in resolving conflicts in the CIS area� The stabi-
lization of the situation in this still troubled region determines the constant and 
stable supplies of energy resources and the creation of conditions for construct-
ing alternative pipelines to Russia and ensuring the diversification of energy 
supplies to bypass Russia� For years, the EU’s goal was to implement the concept 
of building the so-called ‘southern corridor’, covering infrastructure connections 
of the EU and the Caspian countries via Turkey� An essential prerequisite for the 
activity of Western countries in the post-Soviet area is their democratization� Sig-
nificant financial resources have been allocated to this goal since the beginning of 
the 1990s because, in the opinion of European and American decision-makers, all 
processes related to democratization constitute the basis of stability and security� 
To strengthen their position in the region, Western European countries and the 
USA are also to involve post-Soviet countries in cooperation with NATO and 
implement the Eastern Partnership program�
The basis of Chinese involvement in Central Asia is security issues� China 
seeks to secure the western Xinjiang province against possible destabilization 
spreading from or supported by Central Asian states in the local dimension� In 
a broader perspective, Beijing is interested in securing its interests towards Russia 
and the US, both present and active in the region� The post-Soviet area, and espe-
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cially Central Asia, is playing an increasingly important role in economic issues 
of strategic importance for China (especially energy, but also communication)� 
China has emerged as a strategic financial partner for the region, most evident in 
the trade, energy, and infrastructure sectors (Strachota & Jarosiewicz, 2013, p� 84)�
CONCLUSIONS
According to President Putin, the Soviet Union’s collapse was the greatest 
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century� Thirty years after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet area remains the critical direction of Russian 
foreign policy as Russia’s vital interests focus on this area� The so-called ‘imperial 
syndrome’, manifested in the need to be a superpower, concerns Russia� One of 
the main conditions for maintaining superpower status is its domination in the 
post-Soviet area� The Russian Federation uses all possible influence instruments 
to maintain control over the post-Soviet area, treated as the exclusive sphere of 
Russian influence� Among the tools of impact on former Soviet republics, one 
should include some of the most important: political, military, economic, and the 
so-called soft power� Russia has a ‘comprehensive’ impact on the countries of the 
post-Soviet area� Russia’s goal concerning the post-Soviet area is also to contain 
and limit the influence of other players interested in the region�
Russia has a  dominant position among all the former Soviet republics 
regarding political, military, and economic potential� Russia’s policy towards the 
post-Soviet area affects the political strategies of the former Soviet republics� 
Among the former Soviet republics there can be distinguished:
1) the West-oriented outspoken opponents, openly resisting Russian ambi-
tions and applying to Western organizations such as NATO or the EU 
(Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova – the leaders of the Eastern Partnership 
program),
2) pragmatic-oriented players with pendulum behavior (Uzbekistan, Azer-
baijan) or countries calling itself ‘neutral’ (Turkmenistan),
3) relatively stable partners of Russia, representing the core of the CIS 
organization and participating in all Russia-led integration projects in 
the post-Soviet area (Kazakhstan, Belarus),
4) faithful followers of Russia whose security (sovereignty) depends on Big 
Brother (Armenia, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan)�
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